Military Change, Plus Ca Change

In a blistering essay in Armed Forces Journal, William Owen takes aim at those who litter their interpretations and theories of war with careless assertions of ‘newness’ and ‘change’:

War isn’t just transforming — it’s ushering in a whole new language to describe conflict, and this language is used in a way that pays little attention to logic or military history. Thus the forces we used to call guerrillas are now “hybrid threats.” Insurgencies are now “complex” and require “complex and adaptive” solutions. Jungles and cities are now “complex terrain.” Put simply, the discussion about future conflict is being conducted using buzzwords and bumper stickers.

The evidence that the threats of the 21st century are going to be that much different from the threats of the 20th is lacking. Likewise, there is no evidence that a “new way of war” is evolving or that we somehow had a previously flawed understanding. In fact, the use of the new words strongly indicates that those using them do not wish to be encumbered by a generally useful and coherent set of terms that military history had previously used. As war and warfare are not changing in ways that demand new words, it is odd that people keep inventing them.

I broadly agree with him that there is often an assumption that just because things might be difficult, it does not a priori mean that big changes are afoot in the character of war. I’ve often pointed out here that words can obfuscate reality, particularly when budgets or service identities are on the table. There is a political dimension too, and the unfortunate experience of post-9/11 CT/COIN operations has unleashed a huge literature on the misuse of language and the deleterious effect this has had on rhetorical space and degrees of political freedom, not to mention operations themselves.

One passage triggered a reminder of something I felt I ought to post:

To say “warfare is changing” is banal, obvious and thus irrelevant. When did warfare ever not evolve? The acts of Sept. 11 changed nothing in the Thucydidean and Clausewitzian nature of war, or even its modern practice. America’s choice of response did change U.S. foreign policy and defense planning, but the attacks themselves were in no way indicative of any change in the aims and purposes, or even methods, of political violence.

To add to the idea of complex warfare you have the use of the word “adaptive,” as in “adaptive systems.” In relation to military history and thought, adaptation is a normal and enduring phenomenon of armies and participants in war. If you want to see true adaptation, or even “a complex adaptive system,” then look at the British Army from 1914 to 1918.

This led me to recall an important distinction – between adaptation, innovation, and emulation. The following short passage is from Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff’s The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p.6:

Major military change is often treated as being synonymous with military innovation. According to our definition, it is the outcome of military change that determines whether it is major or minor in character. Innovation, on the other hand, is one of three pathways whereby military change occurs, the other two being adaptation and emulation. Innovation involves developing new military technologies, tactics, strategies, and structures. Adaptation involves adjusting existing military means and methods. Adaptation can, and often does, lead to innovation when multiple adjustments over time gradually lead to the evolution of new means and methods. Last, emulation involves importing new tools and ways of war through imitation of other military organizations. It is only when these military means result in new organizational goals, strategies, and structures that innovation, adaptation, and emulation lead to major military change.

I find this a useful terminological and analytical framework for discussions of organisational change, military or otherwise. My doctoral thesis will examine how UK security organisations adapt/innovate/emulate to combat ‘cyber threats’, and this kind of distinction will be a good stepping-off point for that research.