Crossing the Screen into Al Qaeda Media Ops
Evan Kohlmann has the scoop on the role of Ali al-Bahlul in al-Qaeda’s media wing, as-Sahab, in Inside As-Sahaab: The Story of Ali al-Bahlul and the Evolution of Al-Qaida’s Propaganda. Informed by Gitmo court transcripts this is as close as most of us are going to get to finding out how as-Sahab was formed and functioned:
The NEFA Foundation has released a new report by NEFA Senior Investigator Evan Kohlmann titled “Inside As-Sahaab: The Story of Ali al-Bahlul and the Evolution of Al-Qaida’s Propaganda.” The report is based upon previously unseen evidence presented during the recent Guantanamo Bay military commissions trial of Yemeni national Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al-Bahlul. In November 2008, a military jury convicted al-Bahlul of conspiracy, solicitation, and providing material support to terrorism. During questioning conducted by FBI and NCIS agents, Al-Bahlul admitted that he had been “personally appointed” by Usama Bin Laden to take charge of As-Sahaab, allegedly writing the final “martyrdom” wills of 9/11 hijackers and producing one of Al-Qaida’s most enduring terrorist propaganda films, “The Destruction of the U.S.S. Cole” (otherwise known as “State of the Ummah”). The report also analyzes the significance of another exhibit submitted by prosecutors in their case against Mr. al-Bahlul – the rough-cut recorded “martyrdom” will of 9/11 hijacker Ziad Jarrah. According to the NEFA report, “clearly, this revealing video footage seems to suggest that the theatrical ‘martyrdom’ wills of Al-Qaida suicide operatives are much more carefully scripted and deliberately orchestrated than the As-Sahaab Media Foundation would otherwise wish to acknowledge.”
Charged by bin Laden to produce a commemorative video of the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, al-Bahlul seems to have embarked on a fairly steep learning curve to get to grips with online video extraction and editing. His hand-written notes narrate the trouble he had but he eventually produced what he described as “the best recruitment tape thus far”. After producing a clutch of videos he was promoted to Public Relations Secretary and accompanied OBL everywhere with his laptop (”his office on the move”). Prior to 9/11, of which al-Bahlul was given no warning, the AQ media set-up was bundled into a van and prepared for evacuation.
Detained soon after 9/11 al-Bahlul played little part in further media operations so we have no real idea how the operation has progressed since. At some point, Adam Gadahn stepped into a similar role, although I wonder if he too has had to help the Taliban install Windows 98.
Evan concludes:
Perhaps what is most remarkable of all from what we have now learned about As-Sahaab are its convenient portability and relatively negligible fixed infrastructure. If nothing else, the account of Ali al-Bahlul is a reminder that even relatively meager computing resources can be creatively marshaled in order to perform essential logistical tasks on behalf of modern terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaida.
Have laptop, will travel. Have internet, will propagandise.
See the following two reports for more on AQ and its media operations since 9/11:
Seib, Philip (2008), ‘The Al-Qaeda Media Machine’, Military Review, May-June 2008, pp.74-80 [PDF] (my response and follow-up)
Kimmage, Daniel (2008), The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: the Virtual Network Behind the Global Message, RFE/RL Special Report [PDF] (my response)
