I’m twenty minutes late by the British clock but Happy Birthday Nelson Mandela, you terrorist, ex-terrorist, you.

New Sciences of Protection on The Terrors of Design:

In ‘Dissimulation and Terrorism’ Benjamin Bratton interrogated the interrelations between terrorism and the architectures of safe living. Today architects are literally being asked to ‘design out terrorism’. Yet the contemporary relationship between design, architecture and terrorism is a more intimate one. Terrorism makes use of existing architectures of safe living; it uses the concreteness of these architectures to inscribe itself on to the world. The act of terrorism also has a projective architecture of its own, whose conditions of existence of course include the removal of existing architecture. Terrorism is an exceptional violence wrought on an existing architecture and also, a posited counter-architecture itself. Bratton’s key manoeuvre was to demonstrate how the exceptional violence of terrorism solicits an exceptional response, with the consequence that responses to contemporary terrorism also adopt a terroristic form. Exceptional architectures of safe living are constructed in response to the threat of terrorism, constantly uprooting existing architectures of living in the process. Counter-terrorist design comes to validate and normalize the state of emergency brought about by terror and continually concretizes it in its (exceptional) designs for safe living. Terrorism has ceased to become simply a threat to the architecture of the social, but productive of the social architecture itself. In response to this Bratton urges that it must be ensured that this war on terror is only fought, if it must be fought at all, as a provisional moment. It is imperative that the normalization of terror through the architectures of counter-terror design be resisted. Without this resistance there is no telling that this terror will pass and a very real danger that we will dress our cities in its hysterical fashion.

This is a very important thesis. Sociologist Frank Furedi has consistently warned that contemporary political discourse risks normalising fear/terrorism as a default state. Are we to let urban planners and designers normalise our kinetic experiences and design interactions as responses to the perception of terrorism as a an ever-present and existential threat? This is a point Bryan Finoki has written on brilliantly in his comments on the fossilization of the GWOT.

The primary reference for TTOD’s post seems to be a session from a conference at Lancaster University last week on New Sciences of Protection: Designing Safe Living. I notice that one of the speakers was Dan Lockton, whose Architectures of Control blog - subtitled, Design with Intent - has been grappling with these problems for years.

[cross-posted to Complex Terrain Lab]

It pains me to say this but Robert Fox has actually come up with a decent article at The Guardian, Virtually combating real terror. It’s essentially off the back of Daniel Kimmage’s work at RFE/RL [e.g. PDF] and his recent op-ed in the International Herald Tribune (and prior to that at the New York Times, Robert), but I’ve got no problem with bringing Daniel’s basic hypothesis to a new audience. Fox:

With their relentless message of blood and hate al-Qaida are not keen on getting back chat. Socratic dialogue is not their thing, and nor are laughs, apparently. In the more open channels and forums like YouTube images of Bin laden and al-Zawahiri get reactions from approval to explicit and virulent condemnation.

Attempts to run their own dialogues through their chosen media, like al-Sahab, have not been that successful, either. Last December Ayman al-Zawahiri asked for questions online. The questions weren’t produced until last [sic] April “due to security problems” according to bin Laden’s counsellor and guide. The dullness of the material suggests a different story.

Web 2.0-style social networking through the internet is now taking off in the Arabic world, Iran, and further east into southwest Asia. Even the wild lands of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier province are getting increasingly online (new mobile phone acquisition there is currently running at 170% per month). The social networking phenomenon is still frowned on by the most conservative states, however. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria try to block them, and internet traffic is held under tight intelligence surveillance in Libya and Yemen. Now here’s a coincidence: according to repeated US military surveys of origins of foreign jihadi fighters in Iraq most come from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen [see CTC Sinjar report - PDF].

It seems simplistic to say the answer to the preachers of international terror lies in YouTube. But empowering the right of reply would be a good beginning. It would be a salutary experience, too, for the lords of cyber terror and their closet patrons and sponsors in the conservative Arab world and the darker reaches of Pakistan’s military oligarchy.

I’m really not going to pick holes in Fox’s piece. I’m even going to give him the benefit of the doubt for using the phrase ‘Web 2.0-style‘ and take it that he dislikes the 2.0 tag as much as I do. This piece mainly preaches to the choir, but for anyone else it’s worth reading for a lowdown on Kimmage’s research.

I’ve gibbered about Kimmage’s ideas before:

Daniel Kimmage at the ICSR [CTLab]

Daniel Kimmage at the ICSR [Ubiwar, see comments too]

The new issue of Strategic Insights from the Center for Contemporary Conflict contains an article by Kathleen Meilahn, The Strategic Landscape: Avoiding Future Generations of Violent Extremists:

Psycho-social and political factors play an important role in radicalization. Where Islamist Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) are concerned, these factors play a significant role in recruitment—versus just theology. However, once recruited, theology becomes the justification for violent actions. In the initial stages of al-Qaeda’s ascendancy, theological values that became politically radicalized were a driving factor motivating the core actors. As al-Qaeda (AQ) and other VEOs aim to increase in size, their recruitment process has become more oriented toward—or broadened to include—political issues, and those foot soldiers who volunteer are often psycho-socially motivated. Yet, in effect, AQ is “engaged in an unprecedented exercise of corrupting, misinterpreting and misrepresenting the word of God to generate support for their political mission.” [PDF]

Best Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence, manual by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the United States Secret Service:

Computers and digital media are increasingly involved in unlawful activities. The computer may be contraband, fruits of the crime, a tool of the offense, or a storage container holding evidence of the offense. Investigation of any criminal activity may produce electronic evidence. Computers and related evidence range from the mainframe computer to the pocket-sized personal data assistant to the floppy diskette, CD or the smallest electronic chip device. Images, audio, text and other data on these media are easily altered or destroyed. It is imperative that law enforcement officers recognize, protect, seize and search such devices in accordance with applicable statutes, policies and best practices and guidelines.

[h/t DJ Technocrat]

I’m not given to anniversaries or other attendant numerology, but it caught my eye that it’s exactly 12 years since the Khobar Towers truck bombing of 25 June 1996 in Saudi Arabia.

From the FBI indictment of the 14 men charged with offences relating to the bombing:

At about 10:00 p.m. on June 25, 1996, a tanker truck loaded with at least 5,000 pounds of plastic explosives was driven into the parking lot in front of the Khobar Towers residential complex in Dhahran. Moments later a massive explosion sheared the face off of Building 131, an eight-story structure which housed about 100 U.S. Air Force personnel. Although rooftop sentries were immediately suspicious of the truck - parked some 80 feet from the building - and attempted an evacuation, few escaped. Comparable to 20,000 pounds of TNT, the bomb was estimated to be larger than the one that destroyed the federal building in Oklahoma City a year before, and more than twice as powerful as the 1983 bomb used at the Marine barracks in Beirut.

The attacks were attributed to Hizballah Al-Hijaz (Party of God in the Hijaz), with alleged links to al-Qaeda, presumably before the factional Shia/Sunni split. The 9/11 Commission report alleges that Osama bin Laden was seen being congratulated on the day of the bombing, and perhaps acted as a facilitator for the group. Iran has repeatedly been fingered by the US as the state sponsor behind the attacks. None of these allegations has been substantiated by publicly available evidence.

Joshua Woody’s Memorial Site.

Despite accusations that the UK is going to hell in a handcart following the release of “Osama bin Laden’s right-hand man in Europe”, Abu Qatada, and the delightful Jordanian’s subsequent renewal of the call to violent jihad, there are signs that the British judiciary at least retains a semblance of common sense.

On Tuesday 17 June 2008, the UK Court of Appeal quashed the conviction of Samina Malik, the “lyrical terrorist”, for possession of information useful for terrorist purposes under Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Originally convicted on 6 December 2007, Malik was handed a nine-month suspended sentence, partly one suspects because the judge felt under obligation to do something. Judge Peter Beaumont confessed that Malik was an “enigma” to him and that her offence was “on the margins of what this crime concerns.”

The Crown Prosecution Service will not seek a further retrial despite their obvious feeling that she’s guilty as charged, so Samina Malik can return to her life in West London an innocent person under the law. This being Britain, the press will probably hound her until her dying day - this is the country in which paediatricians are harassed for being child molesters, lest we forget. Apparently, the perpetrators of this act of staggering ignorance thought her ‘job title’ was paedophile. They should just have googled her:

I digress, and flippantly at that. The judiciary is evidently having some problems enforcing recent ‘terror’ legislation, at the appeal stage at least. In February 2008, five Muslim students’ convictions for possession of extremist material were also overturned. The ruling in both cases determined that prosecution must show intent to commit terrorism arising from possession of extremist literature. Malik owned a service manual for a 7.62mm semi-automatic Dragunov sniper rifle, but no weapon. Nor had she shown any attempt to obtain one. Ergo, not guilty on that charge. You can download the manual as a PDF if you wish, or indeed the Mujahideen Poisons Handbook [PDF], Essential Provision of the Mujahid [PDF, h/t Marisa], OBL’s “Declaration of War” (take your pick), or any number of other seditious documents in Malik’s house.

Malik may have been heading down an undesirable path, but she had to be acquitted. It might be true that her arrest and subsequent remand halted her progress along the track of radicalisation, but there is the problem of evidence, which in her case and others simply did not qualify as such. Of more concern should have been her relationship with Sohail Qureshi, who at least admitted preparing for terrorism under Section 5 of the Terrorism Act. Intelligence apparently showed that Qureshi had ‘previous’, through his attendance at jihadist training camps, and seemed to be actively gearing up to commit a terrorist offence. Malik allegedly supplied information about Heathrow Airport security procedures to Qureshi, although I’ve seen nothing in this vein that wasn’t publicly available. Qureshi is currently serving a 4½-year sentence in a British prison.

Malik’s acquittal is a mixed bag. Her defence’s argument that her (dreadful) poetry was akin to Wilfred Owen’s WWI complex horrors seems not to have been challenged by the Appeal judge as a spurious legal tactic, let alone a gross miscarriage of literary criticism. Her release helps curtail frivolous and desperate uses of the 2006 legislation, and may strengthen the central provisions of the Act. It also avoids the creation of another martyr, and the British legal system avoids another accusation of being a recruiting sergeant for violent extremists. Will it deter further abuses? Undoubtedly not, but as long as the Appeals Court continues to do its job, hopefully this will create in time a body of sensible applications of the law. If the evidence does not exist, drop the charges, and ramp up your intelligence and policing activities. Don’t bully the judiciary to cover up evidential inadequacies.

Proper commentary on Regina vs. Malik can be found at the following:

NEFA: TerrorWatch on Fatah al-Islam and Samina Malik Powerpoint - Evan Kohlmann at CT Blog

R v Malik [2008] All ER (D) 201 (Jun) - CyberLaw Blog

CPS Response to Salima Malik Appeal - Crown Prosecution Service press

Is It Safe to Download Al Qaeda Manuals Yet? - The Register

‘Lyrical terrorist’ wins appeal - BBC Online

Andrew Conway emailed me during the week to alert me to this:

Last week the Office of the Director of Intelligence (ODNI) Special Security Center (SSC), which acts as ODNI’s personnel security directorate, began soliciting white papers for a new research opportunity called Cyber Behavior and Personnel Security. The theme of this opportunity indicates that ODNI believes an individual’s conduct in cyberspace should be a factor in the security clearance adjudication process.

Andrew’s comments on this programme are well worth reading, as is his new blog Zero Intelligence Agents, which deals with dynamic networks, spatial modelling, human terrain and terrorism, for starters at least. Straight on the blogroll.

I came across the term ‘macroterrorism’ in a forthcoming article on modelling insurgent activity in Iraq. The authors deliberately state their analyses are not designed to predict macroterrorism, ’spectacular acts of terrorism resulting in large losses of life’. This term was coined by Gordon Woo, named in the past as one of the 100 most influential people in finance, and a catastrophe risk consultant at Risk Management Solutions. Given the striking similarity with Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s ‘black swan’ events, I wondered why macroterrorism has not taken off as a concept whilst Taleb’s black swan has become the mot du jour in discussions of almost anything involving risk, finance or terrorism. Taleb is regarded by many as the ‘hottest thinker in the world‘.

Woo defines macroterrorism as a ‘spectacular act of terrorism, (which may be a multiple strike at several locations), which causes more than $1 billion of loss, or 500 deaths‘ [.pdf]. This concept allows scenario modelling to inform the underwriting of terrorism risk. The $1bn benchmark is derived from the 1993 IRA bombing of Bishopsgate in the City of London. These are actually very restrictive criteria, meaning that 9/11 might be the only example. Contrast this to a black swan, which is a large-impact, hard (or impossible) to predict rare event beyond the realm of normal expectations. Hence, black swans are by no means restricted to acts of terrorism, but are very likely to have massive financial implications, such as the global financial meltdown of 19 October 1987 (Black Monday) and, of course, 9/11. Black swans would also include terrorist acts of high death toll with lower threshold criteria than Woo’s, like the 7 August 1998 embassy attacks in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi.

The obvious difference between the two concepts is that macroterrorism is quantitative, reflecting Woo’s actuarial concerns with risk management, whereas black swans are essentially qualitative. Macroterrorism is a modern phenomenon, measured in modern terms; black swans are existential events occurring in both historical and geological time. The importance of these terms depends upon your point of view. By their nature, black swans are impossible to predict and therefore model. Macroterrorist events can also not be predicted per se but the concept can be used to model contingency scenarios and inform risk management strategies.

It’s not hard to see why macroterrorism has not taken off conceptually in the way the black swan has. Its application is limited to the financial world, insurance in particular, and it lacks the appeal and linguistic, metaphorical drama of the black swan. Macroterrorism is modern and empirical; the black swan is ahistoric and theoretical. Macroterrorism is dry; the black swan taps into dark realms of eschatological longing and fascination. Nevertheless, both terms have utility and I post this not in the hope that Woo actually gets to add another event to his data set, but as a reminder that there are other angles to be drawn from theories of spectacular mass-casualty terrorism.

The folks at RAND have been busy, with another COIN report out today: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan by Seth G. Jones, the fourth volume in the RAND Counterinsurgency series [research brief here]. The tone of the report partly reflects what I’ve been hearing the last couple of days about operations in Afghanistan - “comprehensive organisational dysfunction” sticks in my mind - although Jones concentrates more on capacity-building and security security reform:

This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military - along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners - is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.