New Sciences of Protection on The Terrors of Design:

In ‘Dissimulation and Terrorism’ Benjamin Bratton interrogated the interrelations between terrorism and the architectures of safe living. Today architects are literally being asked to ‘design out terrorism’. Yet the contemporary relationship between design, architecture and terrorism is a more intimate one. Terrorism makes use of existing architectures of safe living; it uses the concreteness of these architectures to inscribe itself on to the world. The act of terrorism also has a projective architecture of its own, whose conditions of existence of course include the removal of existing architecture. Terrorism is an exceptional violence wrought on an existing architecture and also, a posited counter-architecture itself. Bratton’s key manoeuvre was to demonstrate how the exceptional violence of terrorism solicits an exceptional response, with the consequence that responses to contemporary terrorism also adopt a terroristic form. Exceptional architectures of safe living are constructed in response to the threat of terrorism, constantly uprooting existing architectures of living in the process. Counter-terrorist design comes to validate and normalize the state of emergency brought about by terror and continually concretizes it in its (exceptional) designs for safe living. Terrorism has ceased to become simply a threat to the architecture of the social, but productive of the social architecture itself. In response to this Bratton urges that it must be ensured that this war on terror is only fought, if it must be fought at all, as a provisional moment. It is imperative that the normalization of terror through the architectures of counter-terror design be resisted. Without this resistance there is no telling that this terror will pass and a very real danger that we will dress our cities in its hysterical fashion.

This is a very important thesis. Sociologist Frank Furedi has consistently warned that contemporary political discourse risks normalising fear/terrorism as a default state. Are we to let urban planners and designers normalise our kinetic experiences and design interactions as responses to the perception of terrorism as a an ever-present and existential threat? This is a point Bryan Finoki has written on brilliantly in his comments on the fossilization of the GWOT.

The primary reference for TTOD’s post seems to be a session from a conference at Lancaster University last week on New Sciences of Protection: Designing Safe Living. I notice that one of the speakers was Dan Lockton, whose Architectures of Control blog - subtitled, Design with Intent - has been grappling with these problems for years.

[cross-posted to Complex Terrain Lab]

It pains me to say this but Robert Fox has actually come up with a decent article at The Guardian, Virtually combating real terror. It’s essentially off the back of Daniel Kimmage’s work at RFE/RL [e.g. PDF] and his recent op-ed in the International Herald Tribune (and prior to that at the New York Times, Robert), but I’ve got no problem with bringing Daniel’s basic hypothesis to a new audience. Fox:

With their relentless message of blood and hate al-Qaida are not keen on getting back chat. Socratic dialogue is not their thing, and nor are laughs, apparently. In the more open channels and forums like YouTube images of Bin laden and al-Zawahiri get reactions from approval to explicit and virulent condemnation.

Attempts to run their own dialogues through their chosen media, like al-Sahab, have not been that successful, either. Last December Ayman al-Zawahiri asked for questions online. The questions weren’t produced until last [sic] April “due to security problems” according to bin Laden’s counsellor and guide. The dullness of the material suggests a different story.

Web 2.0-style social networking through the internet is now taking off in the Arabic world, Iran, and further east into southwest Asia. Even the wild lands of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier province are getting increasingly online (new mobile phone acquisition there is currently running at 170% per month). The social networking phenomenon is still frowned on by the most conservative states, however. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria try to block them, and internet traffic is held under tight intelligence surveillance in Libya and Yemen. Now here’s a coincidence: according to repeated US military surveys of origins of foreign jihadi fighters in Iraq most come from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen [see CTC Sinjar report - PDF].

It seems simplistic to say the answer to the preachers of international terror lies in YouTube. But empowering the right of reply would be a good beginning. It would be a salutary experience, too, for the lords of cyber terror and their closet patrons and sponsors in the conservative Arab world and the darker reaches of Pakistan’s military oligarchy.

I’m really not going to pick holes in Fox’s piece. I’m even going to give him the benefit of the doubt for using the phrase ‘Web 2.0-style‘ and take it that he dislikes the 2.0 tag as much as I do. This piece mainly preaches to the choir, but for anyone else it’s worth reading for a lowdown on Kimmage’s research.

I’ve gibbered about Kimmage’s ideas before:

Daniel Kimmage at the ICSR [CTLab]

Daniel Kimmage at the ICSR [Ubiwar, see comments too]

One of the unsung heroes of this corner of the blogosphere, Ghosts of Alexander, has an excellent post on Russian use of social science in their 19th-century expeditions to Turkestan. In Russia’s Human Terrain System GOA contrasts the investigations into local cultures by the Russians with the current HTS and social science techniques deployed by the US in Afghanistan. And concludes that … bah, why trump the man? Read the article instead.

[Cross-posted at CTLab]

I’ve got a new post up at Complex Terrain Lab:

On Wednesday 11 June 2008 the Frontline Club in London hosted a discussion evening, Media Talk: Assassination and Insurgency - Are the Taliban Winning? Moderated by Nazanine Moshiri of Al Jazeera, the panel brought together Alastair Leithead (BBC), James Fergusson (journalist and author), James Appathurai (NATO spokesman), John D. McHugh (photojournalist) and, via Skype from Kandahar, Mawlavi Abdulsalam Zaeef (ex-Taliban ambassador to Pakistan).

Read the full article here.

Joseph Stiglitz has recently been much in the news, with the February 2008 publication of The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (with Linda Bilmes). On Friday 13 June, Stiglitz was in London at the Frontline Club, in conversation with Stephanie Flanders, Economics Editor of the BBC.

Read the rest of my article at Complex Terrain Lab.

Update: Some feeds may have a broken link - use this one if that’s the case.

This is an alarming anecdote from Tom Englehardt’s reading of Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez’s Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story:

Let me briefly set the scene, as Sanchez tells it on pages 349-350 of Wiser in Battle. It’s April 6, 2004. L Paul Bremer III, head of the occupation’s Coalition Provisional Authority, as well as the president’s colonial viceroy in Baghdad, and Sanchez were in Iraq in video teleconference with the president, then-secretary of state Colin Powell and secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld. (Assumedly, the event was recorded and so revisitable by a note-taking Sanchez.) The first full-scale American offensive against the resistant Sunni city of Fallujah was just being launched, while, in Iraq’s Shi’ite south, the US military was preparing for a campaign against cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia.

According to Sanchez, Powell was talking tough that day: “We’ve got to smash somebody’s ass quickly,” the general reports him saying. “There has to be a total victory somewhere. We must have a brute demonstration of power.” (And indeed, by the end of April, parts of Fallujah would be in ruins, as, by August, would expanses of the oldest parts of the holy Shi’ite city of Najaf. Muqtada himself would, however, escape to fight another day; and, in order to declare Powell’s “total victory”, the US military would have to return to Fallujah that November, after the US presidential election, and reduce three-quarters of it to virtual rubble.) Bush then turned to the subject of Muqtada: “At the end of this campaign al-Sadr must be gone,” he insisted to his top advisors. “At a minimum, he will be arrested. It is essential he be wiped out.”

Not long after that, the president “launched” what an evidently bewildered Sanchez politely describes as “a kind of confused pep talk regarding both Fallujah and our upcoming southern campaign [against the Mahdi Army].” Here then is that “pep talk”. While you read it, try to imagine anything like it coming out of the mouth of any other American president, or anything not like it coming out of the mouth of any evil enemy leader in the films of the president’s - and my own - childhood:

“Kick ass!” [Bush] said, echoing Colin Powell’s tough talk. “If somebody tries to stop the march to democracy, we will seek them out and kill them! We must be tougher than hell! This Vietnam stuff, this is not even close. It is a mindset. We can’t send that message. It’s an excuse to prepare us for withdrawal.

“There is a series of moments and this is one of them. Our will is being tested, but we are resolute. We have a better way. Stay strong! Stay the course! Kill them! Be confident! Prevail! We are going to wipe them out! We are not blinking!”

Shit.

Update: Anonymous informs me that Tom posted this at TomDispatch yesterday.

The ever-excellent Roderick Jones at Counterterrorism Blog (who also blogs at MetaSecurity) posits a future in which virtual assassination could be deployed as an effective a tool as that of the 19th century anarchists:

… a cyberspace assassination would seek to achieve the following aims: prevent the candidate from actually being in cyberspace ( the equivalent of virtual-murder), instill fear amongst their supporters that the same may happen to them and as a side-effect force the political campaigns to spend money on their cyber security or force the Secret Service to protect cyber-personas (the protection of cyber-identities is clearly something that all protective security agencies are going to need to consider). The tools to do this arguably already exist - hackers or botnets for hire could be diverted to these ends. This of course is fast-forwarding to a future more virtualized point where society is more reliant on cyber-spaces but similar tools could be applied today.

As with all things virtual, the scenario can be flipped. The use of precision cyber-attacks (or virtual assassinations) against America’s enemies should be considered today as a tactic to disrupt cyber-terrorists.

Read the article here.

[Cross-posted from Complex Terrain Lab]

On 21 May, Daniel Kimmage, Regional Analyst for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, spoke to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at King’s College London. The basis for the talk was his recently published study The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual Network Behind the Global Message [.pdf] which received a fair amount of attention in the blogosphere and beyond. He is also author, with Kathleen Ridolfo, of The War of Images and Ideas: How Sunni Insurgents in Iraq and Their Supporters Worldwide are Using The Media [.pdf].

Kimmage is worth listening to and reading for many reasons, but the principal advantage Kimmage has over most commentators and analysts on the subject is that he is fluent in Arabic. This provides him with real insight into the practical workings of jihadist media, whilst most of us observe from at least one linguistic remove. His sample in this case was 446 outlets identified in July 2007, of which 78% concentrated on Iraq, in particular the Islamic State of Iraq and Ansar al-Sunnah.

In Kimmage’s analysis, jihadist media have developed media products with consistent and systematic branding, using virtual media production and distribution entities (MPDEs) to link a plethora of groups under the global jihadist umbrella. This strategy, mirroring conventional media structures, imparts a degree of legitimacy and credibility to jihadist narratives, as well as facilitating control over the ideological content of the ‘message’.

It is this desire to control media output that Kimmage identifies as the principal reason why jihadist groups are not at the cutting-edge of technology use, in contrast to much of the reporting and analysis to the contrary. The use of ‘web 2.0′ technologies, such as social networks and video sharing sites, threatens message control and is therefore actively discouraged by jihadist groups. As previously noted, this is a fairly traditional approach to media, one that eschews the reflexivity and interactivity of available technology in favour of one-way message propagation. Essentially, it is a propaganda machine.

Kimmage concluded by examining the origin of foreign fighters in Iraq, the majority of which come from media-repressive regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Libya. He posed this speculative question as a result: could a freer, more interactive internet be the secret weapon against al-Qaeda’s ideology? We are reaching a point where virtual claims and kinetic actions are increasingly divergent - advertisement of this trend could reduce internet radicalisation and help stem the flow of online jihadist rhetoric.

My gut feeling is that this would be a sensible move. The challenge of convincing repressive regimes to open up the virtual media space is a difficult one, and there is also no guarantee that a bottom-up, ‘liberalising’ debate would emerge in those societies in which jihadist media flourishes. Jihadist forums are not exactly welcoming of ideological challenges to their chosen stances, and increased access to the internet and the lifting of censorship is unlikely to be met with analagous social reform either. I am reminded of a notice pinned to the wall of a downtown Cairo internet cafe I occasionally visited: “Our patrons are kindly asked not to mention any of these subjects whilst using the internet: sex, religion, politics.”

Kimmage’s study is an interesting one, with undoubted value but, and he freely admits this, is of limited scope. Jihadist internet use is by no means restricted to the Arabic language, and his sample was kept deliberately manageable in size and time. His assertion that the sophistication of jihadists’ use of internet technology is often overstated has some traction, but equally ignores the fact that those wishing to employ counterstrategies have barely even got to grips with the internet as a contestable space. This is changing, particularly in the U.S. military, but there is a long way to go, conceptually and operationally.

I also find myself thinking that there is an opposite underestimation at work here. The nature of the internet is such that - and I believe a lot of insurgents and terrorists know this - once material is on the internet, it tends to take unpredictable paths. This in itself constitutes the exercise of a strategic choice that this study and others miss: a lot of material is deliberately and wilfully produced just so it can be remixed and reworked by whoever chooses to - this is categorically not an attempt to straitjacket the ‘message’ within a normative media framework. The propaganda of the deed thrives in this viral, memetic environment, which might even be a force-multiplier in the global insurgency.

I wish Daniel luck in finding new employment after the recent restructuring of RFE/RL, and look forward to further work in this field. I suspect a new study might back up many of his findings but also, in the ever-changing and dynamic global information ecology, open up unexpected avenues of research into insurgent media.

Cyber Warrior

Welcome to the U.S. Army Computer Network Operations - Electronic Warfare Proponent (USACEWP) Blogspot. The purpose of this blog is to foster an active “coversation” through updates from the Director and the USACEWP team. We welcome respectful, courteous and open discussion and feedback.

“In the final analysis, there is no “peace” in cyberspace…”

USACEWP is a subordinate organization to the Army’s Combined Arms Center

Curious. Why would the US Army go for a free blog platform, in this case Blogspot, to hold any ‘coversation’ (shurely shome mishtake), let alone with us? I see no mention of the blog on the USACEWP website. Also, there may never be any ‘peace’ in cyberspace but assuming a state of perpetual cyberwar as a starting point is an unwelcome public expression of belligerence. Or am I missing something here? The quoted expert is apparently Brigadier General Jon M. Davis, US Strategic Command (Network Warfare) (according to The Travelin’ Librarian), who is also responsible for saying ‘as long as we have two eyes and opposable thumbs we’ll fight’.

Only two posts on the blog so far, the first on 5 May 2008, which defines cyberspace according to its Wikipedia entry. It concludes with this:

Ultimately, leading the C-E [cyber-electronic] transformation means including everyday citizens and involving them in the process. We’ve been reluctant to do this in the past, but Cyberspace changes all the rules. Cyber Warfare requires Cyber Warriors, men and women whose brains can process information in new and faster ways. At the very least, right now, we need Cyber Thinkers who can help to advance our C-E strategy and doctrine, not just within the information environment but across the entire electromagnetic spectrum, including the use of electromagnetic pulse and directed energy, aircraft survivability, and the defeat of improvised explosive devices (IED).

The second post links to a PBS Frontline show, Cyberwar!, but their CyberLink is broken.

I’m not making this up. I’m missing something here. Help me out.

I meant to post this yesterday but was elsewhere - more of which, later. The Human Security Report Project yesterday released the Human Security Brief 2007 [.pdfs here]:

COMPREHENSIVE NEW STUDY CHALLENGING EXPERT CONSENSUS FINDS INCIDENCE OF TERRORISM DECLINING AROUND THE WORLD.

Terrorism Fatalities Decline as Muslim Support for al-Qaeda Terror Network Plummets

Number of Wars and Death Tolls in Africa Down Dramatically Since 1999

NEW YORK, May 21, 2008—Challenging the expert consensus that the threat of global terrorism is increasing, a new report from the Canadian research team that produced the much-cited Human Security Report in 2005, reveals a sharp net decline in the incidence of terrorist violence around the world.

The Human Security Brief 2007 demonstrates that:

* Fatalities from terrorism have declined by some 40 percent, while the loose-knit terror network associated with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda has suffered a dramatic collapse in popular support throughout the Muslim world.

* There has been an extraordinary, but largely unnoticed, positive change in sub-Saharan Africa’s security landscape. The number of conflicts being waged in the region more than halved between 1999 and 2006; the combat toll dropped by 98 percent.

* The decline in the total number of armed conflicts and combat deaths around the world that was reported three years ago in Human Security Report 2005 has continued.

The Brief was produced by the Human Security Report Project (HSRP) research team at Simon Fraser University’s School for International Studies in Vancouver, Canada. The HSRP’s research is supported by the governments of Canada, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland and the UK.

Full press release available as .pdf here.

Elected Swineherd also blogs this and links to research, also announced yesterday, by the University of Texas at Dallas, which analysed the cost-effectiveness of anti-terrorism policies. It finds that, perhaps unsurprisingly, given what we know about the state of GWOT, the most expensive policies are yielding the lowest returns on investment:

Terrorism Study Overview

Since 9/11, global spending to combat terrorism has increased by about $70 billion a year, but governments have little to show for the expenditures.

Methodology
The study calculates costs and benefits from changes in GDP, value of lives lost or injured, costs of increased homeland security, and the costs of offensive measures.

Key Findings
• Increasing homeland security worldwide by an additional 25 percent results in a payback of about 30 cents on the dollar.
• Increased offensive measures like those against the Taliban after 9/11 offer a payback of 8 to 12 cents on a dollar.
• The biggest benefits would come from increased cooperation among police forces and governments, returning $5 to $15 for every dollar spent.

Implications
• Governments need to subject major anti-terrorism initiatives to similar cost-benefit analyses. By failing to cooperate, governments overdefend targets and underinvest in united approaches, such as coordinated intelligence and police actions.

[Cross-posted to Complex Terrain Lab]